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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH,
N.A., a corporation,
Respondent,
vs.
COLONIAL FORD, INC.,
Case No. 15745

Defendant,
and
LEGRANDE L. BELNAP and
DORIS BELNAP,
Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment entered in favor
of plaintiff/respondent as against defendants/appellants LeGrande
L. Belnap and Doris Belnap by the Honorable G. Hal Taylor,
District Judge, sitting without jury.

Default judgment had

been previously entered against defendant Colonial Ford, Inc.
No appeal was taken from that judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants LeGrande L. Belnap and Doris Belnap
have filed this appeal seeking reversal of judgment of the
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trial court entered in favor of respondent ' First Sec uri't y Bank
of Utah, N.A.

It is respondent's position that the lower

court'

decision should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
At all relevant times prior to September 14, 1976,
defendant Colonial Ford, Inc. held a checking account at the
Sugar House Branch of respondent, First Security Bank of Utah, ,
N .A.

(R. 209.)

Appellants LeGrande and Doris Belnap were

respectively President and Vice President of the corporation.
(R. 192, 171.)

They were also its major shareholders.

(R. ln.'

Prior to September 14, 1976, the corporate checkin;
account became overdrawn in the approximate sum of $57,000.
(R.

209.)

As a result of the overdraft the manager of the

Sugar House Branch of the Bank, Ronald Fulkerson, contacted Mrs.
Belnap by telephone and requested that she arrange for payment
of the overdraft.

(R. 209, 211.)

Eventually, representatiws

of Colonial Ford and of the Bank met on September 10, 1976.
Present at the meeting were David Slater, an officer of Coloniai
Ford, Kenneth Rothey, Colonial Ford's attorney, Mr. Fulkerson,
and the branch's assistant manager, William Allen.

(R.

213.)

At the meeting the bank officers proposed that t~
overdraft be paid by means of a promissory note signed by
Colonial Ford and a guaranty signed by the Belnaps.

(R. 161,

216, 239.)

At trial there was some conflict in the testimony
of the witnesses as to the nature of the guaranty.

Rothey

testified that the guaranty was one of collection.

(R. 161.)
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Fulkerson and Allen testified that the terms of the guaranty
were not discussed.

(R.

216-218.)

Fulkerson further testified

that he showed Rothey the standard guaranty form used by the
Bank which he intended to use in this transaction.

216-217.)

(R.

Fulkerson also testified that prior to this action he was unaware
that a guaranty could be conditional.

(R.

218.)

On September 14, 1976, Fulkerson arranged with
Rothey or with the Belnaps to deliver the documents which he
had prepared.

(R. 218-225.)

He personally delivered the docu-

ments to the Belnaps at the offices of Colonial Ford.

(R.

225.)

When he arrived Mrs. Belnap asked Fulkerson if the documents he
was carrying were those which she had discussed with her attorney.
He responded that they were.

(R. 225.)

Fulkerson further

explained that one of the documents he had brought was a
"personal guaranty".

(R.

225.)

Fulkerson observed that Mr. Belnap examined the
guaranty and other documents before he signed them.

(R.

226.)

The guaranty itself bears the word "GUARANTY" in bold face
type at the top of the form.

(Exhibit P-2.)

Defendant Colonial Ford subsequently defaulted in
making its payments under the note.

Respondent thereupon brought

this action seeking judgment against both Colonial Ford under
the note and against the Belnaps under the guaranty.

Defendant

Colonial Ford failed to answer respondent's Complaint and
default judgment was entered.
plaintiff's

(R. 12.)

Appellants' Answer to

Complaint (R. 14-16) besides a general denial of
-3-
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the allegations of the Complaint set up the twin defenses of
lack of consideration and fraud.

(R. 15, Third Defense, para-

graph 3.)
On January 30, 1978, the Hon. David K. Winder,
Law and Motion Judge, pre-tried the case.

As required by the

Rules of Civil Procedure, respondent's counsel prepared a propo;pre-trial order, a copy of which was personally
appellants' then-attorney, Mr. Rothey.

delivered~

After reviewing the

order, Judge Winder signed it on February 1, 1978.

(R. 107.)

In the order Judge Winder acknowledged that the unresolved

is~

of law related to the defense of fraud raised by appellants in
their Answer.

(R. 106-107, paragraph VI.)

The order, which

had been tacitly approved by appellants' counsel, contained no
indication that appellants wished to raise the issue of mistake.
On the morning of the trial appellants' counsel
moved to strike the pre-trial order -- primarily in an effort tc
allow Mr. Rothey to testify.
listed in the order.)

(He was not one of the witnesses

(R. 140.)

Both counsel agreed to the

striking of the order, whereupon the trial judge reframed the
issues as defined by both counsel.

Based upon his examination

of the discarded pre-trial order and upon his discussion wi~
counsel, the court conducted the following dialogue with bo~
attorneys:
THE COURT:
. . . and based upon the
allegations of fraud, the ultimate determination to be made is whether or not that
guarantee [sic] dated the fourteenth of
September, 1976, is valid. Will you stipulate that that's the issue actually?
MR. KLEMM:

Yes, your Honor.
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MR. GUNN:

Yes, your Honor . . . .

(R. 150-151.)
THE COURT:
So the ~laintiff has made the
prima facie case by the introduction of the
promissory note and the guarantee [sic]. All
you seek to do in this case is to avoid the
guarantee [sic] by the allegation of fraud.
Now does that boil it down to what we are
talking about today?
MR. KLEMM:

I think so, yes.

THE COURT:

Mr. Gunn?

MR. GUNN:
(R.

Yes.

I agree, your Honor.

152.)
In this same conference, which occurred prior to

trial, the court also considered the question of whether appellants
had pleaded the issue of fraud with sufficient particularity.
The court ruled that appellants' pleadings were insufficient but
granted them leave to file an Amended Answer at the time of
trial.

(R.

143.)

At the commencement of the trial appellants submitted
their Amendment setting forth their allegation of fraud with
particularity.

(R. 109-110.)

The Amended Answer contained

no allegation of unilateral or mutual mistake.

(Id.)

During the course of the trial appellants never
once stated that they were attempting to show mistake in the
formation of the contract or that mistake was an issue upon
which they would rely.
R. 155-244.)

(See Transcript of the trial proceedings,

It was only after both sides had rested, during

oral argument, that appellants for the first time raised the issue
of mistake and requested that the court permit them to amend
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their twice-amended answer to raise this issue as an a ff'irmatb,,
defense.

(R.

249.)

The court denied appellants' motion and

subsequently entered judgment in respondent's favor.

(Id., R..

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED APPELLANTS' MOTJ'ON TO
AMEND ITS ANSWER TO RAISE THE AFFIRMATIVE ISSUE OF MISTAKE
After both sides at trial had rested appellants
moved to amend their Answer to raise the affirmative defense oi
mistake.

(R.

249.)

This motion was denied.

Appellants now

base their appeal from the adverse judgment below solely upon
the alleged error of the trial court in failing to grant their
motion.

Appellants contend that the court's denial of their

motion was in error because they were entitled to amend as a
matter of law {Point I of Appellants' Brief), and because even
if the granting of their motion was discretionary, it was
an abuse of discretion to fail to grant their motion.
II of Appellants' Brief.)

(Point

Respondent will demonstrate with

this Brief that appellants' contentions contradict established
principals of law.
A.
THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED AS
A MATTER OF LAW TO GRANT APPELLANTS' MOTION
Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, sets
forth the circumstances under which a pleading may be amended
to conform to the evidence.

It states, in part:

When issues not raised by the pleadings are
tried by express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all respects
as if they had been raised in the pleadings.
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Appellants correctly point out that this rule mandates the
granting of leave to amend in those cases where the court finds
that an issue has been tried by express or implied consent.
From this fact appellants erroneously conclude that the court
below should have granted their motion to amend.

Such a position

assumes a fact not in evidence; namely, that the issue of
mistake was tried by the express or implied consent of respondent.
An examination of the record and of the pleadings
fails to disclose any instance in which respondent expressly
agreed to try the issue of mistake.

Indeed, appellants fail

to direct the court's attention to any such express consent.
Instead, appellants state that the issue of mistake was tried
by the implied consent of respondent and that such consent is
shown by the fact that respondent failed to object to introduction of appellants' testimony to the effect that they believed
they were signing a document different from the one which they
actually signed.

(See page 8 of Appellants' Brief.)

which appellants thus raise is this:

The issue

Did respondent impliedly

consent to trial of the issue of mistake by failing to object
to appellants' testimony that they thought that they were signing
a document different in character than that whi~h they actually
signed?

An examination of cases which have dealt with this

issue indicates that the answer to this question is "no"·
Rule lS(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is
identical to Rule lS(b) of the Utah Rules.

Concerning this rule

Professor Moore has stated:
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The purpose of an amendment to conform to
proof is to bring the pleadings in line with
the actual issues upon which the case was
~ried; therefore an amendment after judgment
is not permissible which brings in some
entirely extrinsic issue or changes the
theory on which the case was actually tried
even though there is evidence in the record'
-- introduced as relevant to some other
issue -- which would support the amendment.
This principal is sound, since it cannot be
fairly said that there is an implied consent
to try an issue where the parties do not
squarely recognize it as an issue in the
trial.
3 Moore's Federal Practice, paragraph 15.13 [2], pp. 15-171 to
15-172.
An excellent illustration of the above rule can
be found in Bettes v. Stonewall Insurance Company, 480 F.2d
92 (5th Cir. 1973).

There, Bettes had brought an action agains'

Stonewall for payment of benefits under an insurance policy.
Stonewall raised the issue of misrepresentation as a defense
to enforcement of the policy.

At trial, after the parties had

rested and the jury had been charged, Bettes sought to amend fr,
pre-trial order to permit him to raise the issue of whether
Stonewall, as required by its policy, had notified him that it
would refuse to be bound by the terms of the policy because of
the alleged misrepresentation.

As with appellants here, Bettes

argued that because he had been permitted to introduce evidence
relevant to both the issues of misrepresentation and notice
without objection of Stonewall, under Rule 15 (b), Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, the trial court had erred in failing to
grant his motion.

Id.at 94.

In rejecting Bettes' argument

the court of appeals stated:
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Bett~s ~laims that certain evidence offered
by.him is so particularly and uniquely appropriate to the issue of notice that Stonewall's
lack of ?bjection constituted implied consent
for the issue to be tried, despite its omission
from the pre-trial order.

At no time during the trial was a request made
for an amendment of the pleadings to conform
to the ~vi~ence, but Bettes correctly notes
that this is not necessarily fatal to his
argument.
[Citation omitted.)
Instead,
the death knell for his argument results from
a careful reading of the record which discloses no evidence that Stonewall gave any
consent -- express, implied, or otherwise -to trying this issue.
Bettes' evidence did
not pertain solely to the issue of notice,
but had general relevance to the entire
defense of misrepresentation.
[Citations
omitted.)
Furthermore, for an issue allegedly
tried by consent, mention of it was conspicuously
absent at the charge conference, in the arguments of both counsel to the jury, and in
charge to the jury.
As such, without warning
that this evidence was being offered to prove
a new issue, its admission without objection
cannot be said to be "implied consent" within
the meaning of Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(b).
Id. at 94-95.
Respondent has been unable to find any Utah cases
which specifically deal with the question of whether failure to
object to the admission of evidence relevant to an unpleaded
issue comprises consent to trial of that issue.

However, the

holding of this court in Taylor v. E. M. Royle Corp., 1 Utah 2d
175, 264

P.2d 279 (1953), indicates that the rule in this state

is that more is required for a showing of consent than the mere
admission of evidence.

There, plaintiff, a former employee of

defendant, brought suit against defendant for claimed damages for
breach of an express contract of employment.

The trial court

found that there had been no express contract but entered judgment
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in plaintiff's favor on a theory of quantum meruit, even thour
the latter theory had never been raised by plaintiff.
this Court reversed the judgment of the lower court.
explaining its reason for doing so, the Court ma d e

t

h e follow

pertinent statement:
[A) defendant must be extended every reasonable
opportunity to prepare his case and to meet an
adversary's claims.
Also he must be protected
against surprise and be assured equal opportunity and facility to present and prove
countercontentions, -- else unilateral justice
and injustice would result sufficient to
raise serious doubts as to constitutional due
process guaranties.
Here the record indicates that the plaintiff
had an express contract in mind, not one
implied in law. Plaintiff sought no change
in theory by way of pleading or proof. We
believe an injustice would result if the rule
were interpreted to charge the defendant with
liability under quantum meruit, an issue he
was never called upon to meet.
Id.

at 177, 264 P.2d at 280.
Although the court's decision in Taylor v. E. M.

Royle Corp. does not specifically state that evidence relevan
to the issue of quantum meruit was admitted without objection
at trial, it is reasonable to assume that such was the case,
since the elements for breach of express contract and for
quantum merui t are very similar.

Nonetheless, the court four

that the trial court had acted improperly in entering judgmer
in plaintiff's favor on a theory he had not pleaded.
Similarly, in National Farmers Union Property and
Casualty Co. v. Thompson. 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P.2d 249 (1955),
court refused to find in defendant's testimony as to the val
-10-
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of a building any consent to trial of that issue where plaintiff
in his complaint had alleged a different value figure and
defendant had admitted the allegation as to value in his answer.
Plaintiff contended that because defendant had testified at
trial as to a different valuation of the building, he had
consented to a reconsideration of that issue.

This Court

disagreed, saying:
Notwithstanding all of our efforts to
eliminate technicalities and liberalize
procedure, we must not lose sight of the
cardinal principle that under our system
of justice, if an issue is to be tried and
a party's rights concluded with respect
thereto, he must have notice thereof and an
opportunity to meet it. This is recognized
in Rule 15(b) which recites that such
liberal amendments shall be allowed if the
issue is tried "by express or implied consent
of the parties." It does not appear that
there was any such consent to try the
issue of the value of the building.
Id. at 13, 286 P.2d at 253.
A different result was reached in General Insurance
Co. of America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corporation, 545 P.2d
502 (Utah 1976), cited by appellants in their Brief.

There

this Court permitted a defendant to amend his answer at trial
to deny the allegation in plaintiff's Complaint that a certain
indemnity agreement had been executed by defendant for consideration.

Defendant's answer had initially failed to admit or deny

the relevant allegation in plaintiff's Complaint with the result
that the allegation was deemed admitted.

~

The court held that

since plaintiff had failed to object to admission of evidence showing lack of consideration, he had consented to trial

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology
Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-11Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of that issue.

Id. at 506.

At first glance it may appear that there exists
an inconsistency between the results in General Insurance of
America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp.,

.§.~~'

on the one hand and

Taylor v. E. M. Royle Corp., and National Farmers Union v.
Thompson, supra, on the other, since in the former case leave.
amend was granted but entry or modification of judgment based
upon unpleaded issues was discouraged in the latter two cases.
In reality, all three cases support the rule that "an amendmen:
after judgment is not permissible which brings in some

entiu~

extrinsic issue or changes the theory on which the case was
actually tried, even though there is evidence in the record -introduced as relevant to some other issue -- which would
support the amendment."

3 Moore's

~!15.13[2],

supra.

In the

General Insurance Co. case, supra, defendants proffer of evidei
as to lack of consideration in executing the indemnity agreement could only have been interpreted as going to the issue of
lack of consideration.

By contrast, in the Taylor case, supra,

evidence as to services rendered and as to damages would be
relevant to both the theory of breach of express contract and
to that of quantum meruit.
And in National Farmers Union evidence of value
was presented by the party not seeking to raise that issue, the
in General Insurance Co., the adverse party had notice that

t~

· ·
· ssue for
party subsequently seeking amen cl men t was raising an l
which amendment could be sought, but in Taylor and National
Farmers Union the adverse party had no such notice.

It folloi:c
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that far frora rejecting the rule set forth in Moore's and
Bettes v. Stonewall Insurance Co., supra, the Utah court accepts
the rule that the adverse party's failure to object to admission
of evidence relating to a subsequently raised issue does not
necessarily show his consent to trial of that issue.
In the instant action appellants contend that
respondent's failure to object to the testimony of appellants
that they were laboring under an incorrect impression as to
the contents of the documents they signed shows that respondent
consented to trial of the issue of mistake.

As discussed above,

this argument betrays an incomplete understanding of the law.
The true rule as set forth by Moore, supra, is that there can
be no implied consent to try an issue "where parties do not
squarely recognize it as an issue in the trial."

3 Moore's

1115.13 [2], supra.
In the instant case the sole issues raised by
appellants in their pleadings and in their pre-trial stipulation as to issues were (1) lack of consideration and (2) fraud.
An examination of the elements of fraud reveals that it would
have been possible for appellants to have adduced evidence
relevant to both mistake and fraud.
This Court has defined the elements of fraud as
follows:
(1)
That a representation was made; (2)
concerning a presently existing material
fact; (3) which was false; (4) which the
representor either (a) knew to be false, or
(b) made recklessly, knowing that he had
insufficient knowledge upon which to base
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~uch

representation; (5) for the purpose of
inducing the other party to act upon it;
(6) that the other party, acting reasonab_ly
and in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in
fact rely upon it; ( B) and was thereby induced
to act; ( 9) to his injury and damage.
(Emphasis added.)

Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 144-145, 247 P.2d 273, 274-275
(1952).

As indicated by the emphasized portion of the above

quotation, in order to prove fraud, the party with the burden
must show that he acted reasonably and in ignorance of the
falsity of the misrepresentation.
In the instant case appellants' proffer of proof
as to their ignorance of the contents of the documents which
they signed was perfectly consistent with their theory of

f~~

-- specifically, the allegations contained in paragraphs 4 (f)
and 4(g)

of appellants' Amendment to Defendant's Answer to

Complaint dated February 2, 1978, wherein appellants allege:
The defendants acted reasonably in signing
the guaranty agreement on the basis of the
representation and were ignorant of its
false nature at the time the guaranty was
signed.
The defendants relied upon the representation made by the said Ronald Fulkerson in
signing the document.
Furthermore, appellants' counsel specifically repre·
sented to the court immediately prior to the trial that the so:
issues to be tried were lack of consideration and fraud.

In

view of this representation and also in view of the fact thrt
the evidence submitted was consistent with appellants' al~~l
of fraud, it is clear that respondent did not and could not~
recognized that appellants' evidence was offered for the purpo:
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of showing mistake.

Thus, respondent cannot be said to have

"consented" to trial of the issue of mistake.
Furthermore, the question of whether or not there
was consent to trial of a particular issue is left to the
determination of the trial court.

Thus, one court has stated:

Once an issue has been tried by express or
implied consent of the parties, Rule 15(b)
requires it be treated as if raised by the
pleadings.
[Citations omitted.] Where the
question is whether that is the case, however,
the essential inquiry is the understanding
of the parties as to whether the unpleaded
issue was being contested.
[Citations omitted.]
The trial judge's answer to that inquiry is
reviewable only for abuse of discretion.
[Citations omitted.]
He is in a far better
position than we to determine the understanding
under which the parties proceeded. Where the
new issue or theory is raised only after
trial, courts of appeals have been loathe to
overturn the decision of the trial judge
that it was not tried by consent.
Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 478 n.370
(D.C. Cir.

1977).
Since there is ample evidence to support the conclu-

sion that respondent did not consent to trial of the issue
of mistake, the trial court clearly did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant appellants' leave to amend their
Answer to raise this issue.
B.

THE LO\mR COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
REFUSING TO GRANT APPELLANTS' MOTION TO
AMEND ITS ANSWER
As discussed above, Rule 15(b}, Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, requires the court to grant leave to amend a
pleading to conform to the evidence if trial of the issue for
which amendment is sought was consented to by the adverse party.
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In addition, Rule lS(b) also permits the granting of leave to
amend at the discretion of the trial court.

In pertinent

part, the rule states:
If evidence is objected to at the trial
on the ground that it is not within the
issues made by the pleadings, the court
may allow the pleadings to be amended
when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the
objecting party fails to satisfy the court
that the admission of such evidence would
prejudice him in maintaining his action
or defense upon the merits.
While conceding that the above provision gives the court discretion in determining whether a motion seeking leave to a~~
will be granted, appellants at the same time contend that t~
trial court abused its discretion in denying their motion.
This Court has considered the issue raised by
appellants in at least two cases.

Thus, in Meyer v. Deluke,

23 Utah 2d 74, 457 P.2d 966 (1969), the Court affirmed the
decision of the trial court denying the motion of defendant,
subsequent to judgment, seeking leave to amend his answer to
raise the affirmative defense of usury.

The Court said:

In the instant action the defendants waived
their statutory defense of usury; the facts
were known to them at the time of their
pleading and were, in fact, pleaded; they
merely failed to assert the defense of usury.
The only effect of their proposed amendment
would be to withdraw their waiver of this
statutory defense, not because of new
evidence which was revealed at trial, but,
because their asserted defenses were inadequate for them to prevail.
Under these
circumstances the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by its refusal to permit an
amendment to the pleadings.
Id. at 78, 457 P.2d at 968-969.
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Similarly, in Goeltz v. Continental Bank & Trust
~'

5 Utah 2d 204, 299 P.2d 832 (1956), this court affirmed

the order of the trial court denying defendant leave to amend
its answer to plead the statute of limitations after all evidence
had been presented at trial.

In affirming the decision of the

lower court this Court noted that all facts upon which the
defense of limitations was based had been known to the defendant
prior to trial and that no new evidence was discovered during
the trial which would have made the defense available where
it had not been available before.
P. 2d at 834,

Id. at 208-209, 299

835.
As in Meyer v. Deluke and Goeltz v. Continental

Bank, supra, prior to the time of trial appellants in this case
were well aware of the facts upon which a claim of mistake could
be based.

Thus, under the holdings of the above cited cases,

it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to have
denied appellants' motion for leave to amend.
Conversely, respondent would have been prejudiced
had the court granted appellants' motion.

As discussed more

fully below, this Court has recognized that unilateral mistake
is not grounds for rescission of a contract if it would not be
possible to give relief by way of rescission without serious
prejudice to the other party.
Utah 650, 231 P.2d 725 (1951).

Ashworth v. Charlesworth, 119
Similarly, it has been recognized

that mistake is not grounds for avoiding a contract if the
party against whom avoidance is sought can demonstrate that he
did not know about the alleged mistake.
§143,

p.

892.

17 C.J.S. Contracts
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In the instant action respondent wishes to represenc
to this Court that it could have proved that it could not have
been placed in the status quo if the contract were rescinded,
and that i t did not know about the alleged mistake.

However,

because the issue of mistake was first raised at the conclusic
of the trial, after respondent had rested, respondent had

00

opportunity to present its evidence as to the above issues.

~

follows that the trial court was correct in recognizing that
respondent would have been prejudiced by the requested amendment.

For the same reason this Court should affirm the lower

court's ruling.
POINT II
EVEN IF THE COURT RULED INCORRECTLY IN REFUSING TO
GRANT APPELLANTS' MOTION, SUCH ERROR WAS HARMLESS
It is a well-established doctrine of this Court that
harmless error of the trial court is not grounds for reversal
of its judgment.

Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, pro·

vides, in part:
No error in either the admission or the
exclusion of evidence, and no error or
defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or b~
any of the parties, is ground for granting
a new trial or otherwise disturbing a
judgment or order, unless refusal.to ta~e
such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.
concerning the rule of "harmless error" this Court
has stated that the judgment of the trial court will not be
overturned unless the nonprevai· l'ing party shows that the trial
-18-
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court committed error "which is substantial and prejudicial in
the sense that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its
absence the result would have been different.

.

Hales v.

Peterson, 11 Utah 2d 411, 415, 360 P.2d 822, 825 (1961);
Rivas v. Pacific Finance Company, 16 Utah 2d 183, 186, 397
P.2d 990, 992

(1964).

An examination of the law of mistake clearly shows
that if the lower court committed error in failing to grant
appellants' motion, such error was harmless for the reason
that even if appellants had been allowed to raise the issue
of mistake, they could not have prevailed on such a theory.
While it is not clear from the statements of
appellants' counsel at trial whether appellants were alleging
the existence of unilateral or mutual mistake, appellants'
Brief makes it clear that they allege unilateral mistake.
Thus, appellants state:
The defendants are alleging that the guarantee
[sic) that they signed should be rescinded
because of their unilateral mistake.
(Brief
of Appellants, p. 14.)
It is well established that unilateral mistake will not provide
a basis for rescission or cancellation of an instrument except
where it would be inequitable to enforce the contract.
Equity will relieve a party from a unilateral
mistake that was a result of fraud or duress
or was accompanied by other special facts
creating an independent equity on behalf of
the mistaken person, such as inequitable conduct
of the other party, but cancellation shall not
be decreed upon a party whose conduct did not
contribute to or induce the mistake and who
will obtain no unconscionable advantage therefrom.
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13 Am. Jur. 2d Cancellation of Instruments,

§

32.

Equity will not relieve one from the burden
of a contract entered into by reason of a
mistake resulting from negligence where the
means of knowledge were easily accessible.
Id. at 834.
This Court has on at least two occasions defined ~
circumstances under which unilateral mistake may provide a
basis for cancellation.

In Ashworth v. Charlesworth, supra,

the court ennunciated the following rule concerning cancellab
of instruments based upon unilateral mistake:
Equitable relief from a mutual mistake is
frequently given by a reformation of the
contract. But a contract will not be reformed
for unilateral mistake. Equitable relief may,
however, be given from a unilateral mistake by
Essential cona rescission of the contract.
ditions to such relief are:
(1)
The mistake
must be of so grave a consequence that to
enforce the contract as actually made would
be unconscionable.
(2)
The matter as to which
the mistake was made must relate to a material
feature of the contract.
(3)
Generally the
mistake must have occurred notwithstanding the
exercise of ordinary diligence by the party
making the mistake.
(4)
It must be possible
to give relief by way of rescission without
serious prejudice to the other party except
the loss of his bargain.
In other words, it
must be possible to put him in status quo.
Id. at 656, 231 P.2d at 726.

See also, Davis v. Mulholland, '

Utah 2d 56, 57, 475 P.2d 834 (1970).
In Ashworth v. Charlesworth, supra, plaintiff, a
contractor, sued defendant, a subcontractor, who had repufil~
a contract for the painting of a bridge which plaintiff had
constructed.

The evidence showed that defendant had had t~
-20-
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opportunity to examine the plans and specifications and to read
the contract before executing it.

Based upon these facts the

trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and found
that defendant's mistaken belief as to the size of the bridge
and as to the materials which defendant thought that plaintiff
would supply did not comprise the type of unilateral mistake
which would permit cancellation of the contract.

In affirming

the lower court's decision, this Court made the following statement whose relevance to the instant action is obvious:
From the foregoing facts and circumstances, we
are of the opinion that the findings of the
trial court to the effect that there was no
mistake is not contrary to the weight of the
evidence. He could have reasonably concluded
that the claimed mistake was an afterthought.
But even assuming the mistake was made by the
defendants, they were guilty of such carelessness in not seeing what they should have seen
and in not obtaining readily available information that the trial court was not obliged
to relieve them from the results of their own
neglect.
The fault, if any, in this case, appears
to fall heavily upon the shoulders of the defendants.
Id. at 659, 231 P.2d at 728.
Similarly, in Davis v. Mulholland, supra, this Court
refused to rescind an option agreement containing the description of a certain parcel of land which was not the same parcel
shown to the party seeking rescission.

In affirming the lower

court's judgment this Court stated:

Plaintiff admits that he was given the correct
legal description of the land actually owned by
the defendant; and since the court found that
there was no misrepresentation on the part of
the defendant in pointing out the location of
the land, the plaintiff cannot have a rescission
of the option contract for the reason that if
there was any mistake on his part, it was due
ponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding
for digitization
provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
entirely
to his
own
negligence.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Id. at 58, 475 P.2d at 835.
In the instant action, the findings of fact by t~
lower court make it clear that if there did exist a unila~u
mistake, that mistake could have been avoided if appellantsl
exercised ordinary care.

In this regard the court's findina·

"'

of fact show the following examples of appellants' negligence
and lack of due diligence:
(1)

At the time the Belnaps executed the

guaran~

they knew or should have known that their attorney had not exo:
or approved it.
(2)

(R. 118, Finding 12.)
The Belnaps did not read the guaranty prior to

or at the time of their signing it.
( 3)

The Belnaps were knowledgeable as to the legal

significance of the guaranty.
(4)

(Finding 13.)

(Findings 14 and 15.)

At the time of the execution of the guaranty

the Belnaps had not even taken the trouble to find out what
agreement their attorney had reached with the Bank's
tatives.

repree~

(Findings 16.)
Based upon the foregoing it is clear that even if

appellants had been permitted to amend their answer at the ti~
of trial to raise the issue of unilateral mistake, and even if
they had been successful in convincing the court that such
mistake existed, their negligence was sufficient to prevent
cancellation or rescission of the guaranty.

It follows that

the court's refusal to permit an amendment was at worst a
harmless error.
-22-
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COtlCLUS ION
Appellants allege that the decision of the trial
courl must be reversed because of its refusal at the conclusion
of the trial to permit appellants to amend their answer to raise
a new issue not previously raised in the pleadings or in the
pre-trial conferences.

Rule lS(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure and the relevant case law mandate that the decision
of the trial court be affirmed unless it can be demonstrated
that respondent consented to trial of the issue of mistake
or that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
permit such amendment.

The record on appeal clearly indicates

that at no time did respondent ever consent to trial of the
issue of mistake.

Indeed, an examination of the record makes

it clear that respondent first became aware that appellants
intended to raise this issue near the conclusion of the trial.
Correspondingly, inasmuch as respondent had no opportunity
through the presentation of evidence to meet the allegation of
mistake, respondent would have been prejudiced by the granting
of appellants' motion.

The trial court was therefore clearly

correct in denying appellants' motion.
In any case, even if appellants were otherwise
entitled to the granting of their motion, the Findings of Fact
of the trial judge and the record on appeal demonstrate that
the alleged mistake was not of such a nature as to result in the
cancellation or rescission of the guaranty in question.

-23-
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